The Foundations of Morality by Henry Hazlitt is an essentially correct analysis of morality; I recommend it highly2. You can, if you like, read his Summary and Conclusion but that might be a mistake; it is better to start from the beginning.
Somewhat more precisely, it is a morality-schema; its main point is not pushing any one morality3, but in telling you what morality is.
And the schema is: morality is a system of general rules that ensure social cooperation in the long-term.
Other, failed, theories
There are many many wrong theories of morality. Hazlitt goes through various of these; I won't. That morality is divinely imposed, I consider not worth considering. Kant's ethics of Duty doesn't work, as everyone who reads it immeadiately realises, the only puzzle left being why people take him seriously.
Morality, Law, Manners
Morality is abstract rules that you should observe, for your own long-term good and the good of society, which in itself is your own long-term good. Law (as opposed to legislation) is similar, but enforced by coercion by the State when required; since it is enforced by coercion it should be the minimum. Manners are again similar, but enforced by disapprobation or honour.
The curious case of Haidt
There's a curious relationship to Moral foundations theory, which is essentially what went into The Righteous Mind. The curiousity is that much of the value of TRM is contained in FOM, and yet nowhere does Hadit show any awareness of prior art. It seems unlikely that he can genuinely be ignorant; that leaves rather less pleasant motives for the exclusion. Because whilst TRM contains quite a bit that FOM doesn't cover - Haidt is rather interested in explaining political differences - there is much that could be compressed into "read Hazlitt". The same goes for Morality as cooperation, 2024/031. Haidt has a slightly different focus, as the word "Righteous" implies, but that's not enough.
As a bonus, Hadit's definition of morality, viz Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate self-interest and make cooperative societies possible, isn't as good, since it omits the explicit "long term", which would have got him out of his cult and fascist problems.
One of Haidt's prize examples is the eating-a-dog. He struggles to fit that into his schema, because he struggles mightily to ensure that no harm is done. But everyone "knows" it is immoral, and in Hazlitt's version it is clear why: it is violating one of our taboos, which we know even though we don't know the reason we have it.
Notes
1. When we discussed that then, Tom complained that I'd omitted coercion in discussing cooperation. In retrospect I should have said that is simply part of it.
2. Although not unreservedly; he needs to read a bit more Popper; he wouldn't be so confused by Thrasymachus if he had. And his discussion of free will, like everyone else's, is a waste of space.
3. Although he correctly defends Capitalist morality and attacks Socialist "morality".
Refs
* ACX reminds me how tit-for-tat fits into this (though why early-Christians weren't cooperate-bot is obvious: despite the fine words, they were effectively tit-for-tat with a high forgiveness factor).
* Bryan Caplan in Maximum Progress on Progressivism recommends Huemer's Ethical Intuitionism (also available for free via IA). A quick scan says I don't believe him, but I should look closer... the index has no entry for Hazlitt, which is dodgy.
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