An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals is a book by Scottish enlightenment philosopher David Hume. I'll stop quoting from Wiki there because the rest of the article isn't so great, in my humble opinion. Be warned that whilst I of course regard my own views as the finest available, I am to some extent riding my hobby horse in this review, and indeed in bothering to read the thing at all. Follow along with the text from Gutenberg.Context: as we all know, The Foundations of Morality were ably described by Hazlitt in 1964 and less ably paraphrased by me as a system of general rules that ensure social cooperation in the long-term for everyone's benefit. Hume doesn't know that, since he died in 1776 and wrote his book in 1751. But it is interesting to see how far he got.
The answer is that he did well, and indeed reading him I find more sense than elsewhere, but he still only gets a partial credit.
Wiki is keen to tell me that he thinks the foundations of morals lie with sentiment, not reason; that might arguably be true, but isn't really interesting, and rather misses the point6. I wonder if I might make some attempt to improve the article but I doubt I have the strength of will; instead I contented myself with some cosmetic enhancement.
Instead, Hume's principle contention is that morality is grounded on usefulness; specifically, usefullness to society as a whole. This, you will immeadiately notice, bears a strong resemblance to Hazlitt's theory, in that the kind of usefullness Hume is thinking of is fostering the bonds of society.
Some quotes for Utility: We may observe that, in displaying the praises of any humane, beneficent man, there is one circumstance which never fails to be amply insisted on, namely, the happiness and satisfaction, derived to society from his intercourse and good offices... As these topics of praise never fail to be employed, and with success, where we would inspire esteem for any one; may it not thence be concluded, that the utility, resulting from the social virtues, forms, at least, a PART of their merit, and is one source of that approbation and regard so universally paid to them? and In all determinations of morality, this circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever disputes arise, either in philosophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty, than by ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind. If any false opinion, embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail; as soon as farther experience and sounder reasoning have given us juster notions of human affairs, we retract our first sentiment, and adjust anew the boundaries of moral good and evil. He does notice, though, that there are sometimes difficulties in deciding what is useful: Giving alms to common beggars is naturally praised; because it seems to carry relief to the distressed and indigent: but when we observe the encouragement thence arising to idleness and debauchery, we regard that species of charity rather as a weakness than a virtue.
Section 3 discusses Justice. This is odd, to me, because Justice is not part of Morality. Morality is sort-of short-range Justice, and Justice long-range Morality2. My book's annotations offer me Hume is not thinking of justice in terms of criminal justice. He is discussing political rights and rules of property. But that doesn't really help; Justice, in these texts, is usually such rather than criminal justice. So I hold this to be a flaw in Hume. He offers the interesting: Were there a species of creatures intermingled with men, which, though rational, were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their resentment and concludes that the necessary consequence, I think, is that we should be bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them, nor could they possess any right or property, exclusive of such arbitrary lords. He offers animals as an example; but that fails, because they are not rational. He offers women, under some circumstances, as another; that too fails, as he himself admits. I think that such creatures, were they to exist, would be disadvantaged; but I see no reason why they would not be part of Justice. I also, on reflection, can't see why he brought the idea up.
Section 4, Of Political Society, contains Why abridge our native freedom, when, in every instance, the utmost exertion of it is found innocent and beneficial? It is evident, that, if government were totally useless, it never could have place, and that the sole foundation of the duty of allegiance is the ADVANTAGE, which it procures to society, by preserving peace and order among mankind which I find dubious. He fails to consider what we see in some places today, effectively govt-by-brigands. But his general point, that we tolerate the restrictions that govt puts on our liberty because of their overall usefulness, remains. He also correctly notes what I think I've said elsewhere: that the laws of good manners [are] a kind of lesser morality.
Section 5, Why Utility Pleases, starts by observing that It seems so natural a thought to ascribe to their utility the praise, which we bestow on the social virtues, that one would expect to meet with this principle everywhere in moral writers, as the chief foundation of their reasoning and enquiry. This echoes Popper's plaintive wondering. I don't think he quite ever says that this utility would seem far too plebian for the elevated minds of the antients and the prissy moderns; morality is "meant" to be finer than that5. And there's the quite Hazlittian And as the public utility of these virtues is the chief circumstance, whence they derive their merit, it follows, that the end, which they have a tendency to promote, must be some way agreeable to us, and take hold of some natural affection. It must please, either from considerations of self-interest, or from more generous motives and regards.
Part 2 of that section begins Self-love is a principle in human nature of such extensive energy, and the interest of each individual is, in general, so closely connected with that of the community, that those philosophers were excusable, who fancied that all our concern for the public might be resolved into a concern for our own happiness and preservation... we must renounce the theory, which accounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self-love. We must adopt a more public affection, and allow, that the interests of society are not, even on their own account, entirely indifferent to us. This I think is where he falls behind Hazlitt. He sees quite clearly that on occasion our own selfish desires will push us to behave immorally or unjustly. Unlike Hazlitt, he doesn't emphasise that in general, self and societies interests are strongly aligned (and we could not survive in society otherwise). Unlike Hazlitt, he doesn't quite realise that morality forces us to act against our own best - or at least immeadiate - interests at times. He is forced to take refuge in It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature. But Hazlitt doesn't need this principle; because he has an economic multiple-timescale view.
This theory of utility explains why Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues [are] everywhere rejected by men of sense; they are not true virtues for society. And so A gloomy, hair-brained enthusiast, after his death, may have a place in the calendar; but will scarcely ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and society.
I'll stop at a part of the conclusion: But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous to society, than those here delivered, which represent virtue in all her genuine and most engaging charms, and makes us approach her with ease, familiarity, and affection? The dismal dress falls off, with which many divines, and some philosophers, have covered her; and nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability; nay, even at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety. She talks not of useless austerities and rigours, suffering and self-denial. She declares that her sole purpose is to make her votaries and all mankind, during every instant of their existence, if possible, cheerful and happy; nor does she ever willingly part with any pleasure but in hopes of ample compensation in some other period of their lives. The sole trouble which she demands, is that of just calculation, and a steady preference of the greater happiness. Notice that the self and society are deemed to be aligned, as long as we are capable of "just calculation" and "steady preference of the greater happiness". But for some, that is too much to ask.
Right, that's about yer lot; I've written enough on this. But before I go, some trivia. Hume was apparently disappointed by the reception of his A Treatise of Human Nature and attempted to improve his prose style in this tome4. Alas, while his writing is all very gentlemanly and good-natured, he constantly falls into over-flowery prose with convoluted reversed syntax and mostly refuses to write plain simple sentences; he learnt the wrong lessons. Trivia two is that he believes that we can only expect success, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances; this is very Baconian of him, and all too apt for the man who first formulated the Problem of Induction; we naturally forgive him for failing to forsee Popper's solution of the problem, by denying his method of producing science1. T3 is that Morality is fundamentally relational; it is our acts and effects that are moral, or otherwise. Hume however is inclined to think in terms of a more unipolar "moral character", perhaps a-la Aristotle.
Does reading moral philosophy make me any more moral? No. Per Kant, everyone has a good idea of what ordinary everyday morality is3. Similarly, no-one needs a background in number theory in order to do addition. But it does help make sense of edge cases, like international relations; or woke and our ever-shifting moral system.
Notes
1. I don't want to push this too hard here, but I think you can see this even in the text of his work. He does consider examples; but from them he pulls a theory - utility - and proceeds to "test" that, and discover that he cannot refute it. As yet another trivia point, I found this for myself recently: looking at - solving - one of those IQ test puzzles I found on the wub, where there is, effectively, a sequence and you have to find the next term, I realised that what I was doing was guessing patterns, and then testing them.
2. There's another aspect between them that I don't think Hume mentions, that Justice (in the sense I am thinking of; of obedience to the Law) is a negative virtue whereas Morality has both positive and negative. The Law will punish the unjust (ideally) but it will not reward the just. Whereas society punishes the immoral and rewards the moral. I almost think there ought to be a physical analogue for this, related to the long / short distinction.
3. Or from the present work, Such frequent occasion, indeed, have we, in common life, to pronounce all kinds of moral determinations, that no object of this kind can be new or unusual to us; nor could any FALSE views or prepossessions maintain their ground against an experience, so common and familiar.
4. There are some nice little bon-mots, of the kind I think a cultivated man is expected to include; for example: A man's time, when well husbanded, is like a cultivated field, of which a few acres produce more of what is useful to life, than extensive provinces, even of the richest soil, when over-run with weeds and brambles.
5. But there's another bon-mot to analogise this: If the ground, on which the shadow is cast, be not broken and uneven; nor the surface from which the image is reflected, disturbed and confused; a just figure is immediately presented, without any art or attention. And it seems a reasonable presumption, that systems and hypotheses have perverted our natural understanding, when a theory, so simple and obvious, could so long have escaped the most elaborate examination.
6. I feel obliged to write something, if incomplete, here. Already the book is slipping from my memory. Hume's point is that ultimately our desire rests on what-we-desire, which is sentiment, or feeling. Our ends cannot be rationally justified (sez 'e). But he is quite clear that rationality is needed to chose amongst our various possible actions.
Refs
* RETRACTED: Climatic consequences of the process of saturation of radiation absorption in gases by Jan Kubicki, Krzysztof Kopczyński, Jarosław Młyńczak.
