Rawls on Liberty

I wasn't too keen on Rawls, but on New Year's Eve I happened to sit by a copy of AToJ so opened it in the middle, to Liberty, and read (around p 203, if you care):

Thus persons are at liberty to do something when they are free from certain constraints either to do it or not to do it and when their doing it or not doing it is protected from interference by other persons. If, for example, we consider liberty of conscience as defined by law, then individuals have this liberty when they are free to pursue their moral, philosophical, or religious interests without legal restrictions requiring them to engage or not to engage in any particular form of religious or other practice, and when other men have a legal duty not to interfere. A rather intricate complex of rights and duties characterizes any particular liberty. Not only must it be permissible for individuals to do or not to do something, but government and other persons must have a legal duty not to obstruct.

This is a bit iffy, although only a bit. If we consider, with Rawls, liberty of conscience - and taking the model of the US constitution - then there are indeed no legal restrictions, but the "other persons... legal duty not to interfere" is diffuse: it consists merely in not breaking the general laws; there are or should be no specific laws prohibiting individual's interference in another's freedom of religion. It's also just not very well written; "be permissible for" is subtly different from, and worse than, "the state is forbidden to interfere with". So I think he's failed to learn from his own constitution, which is regrettable.

Our Author continues:

Several brief comments. First of all, it is important to recognize that the basic liberties must be assessed as a whole, as one system. That is, the worth of one liberty normally depends upon the specification of the other liberties, and this must be taken into account in framing a constitution and in legislation generally. While it is by and large true that a greater liberty is preferable, this holds primarily for the system of liberty as a whole, and not for each particular liberty. Clearly when the liberties are left unrestricted they collide with one another. To illustrate by an obvious example, certain rules of order are necessary for intelligent and profitable discussion. Without the acceptance of reasonable procedures of inquiry and debate, freedom of speech loses its value. It is essential in this case to distinguish between rules of order and rules restricting the content of speech. While rules of order limit our freedom, since we cannot speak whenever we please, they are required to gain the benefits of this liberty. Thus the delegates to a constitutional convention, or the members of the legislature, must decide how the various liberties are to be specified so as to yield the best total system of equal liberty. They have to balance one liberty against another. The best arrangement of the several liberties depends upon the totality of limitations to which they are subject, upon how they hang together in the whole scheme by which they are defined.

And this too seems iffy. The general laws do prohibit govt interference in freedom of speech, and don't impose any "rules restricting the content of speech" except for the most extreme cases. His analogy of a constitutional convention fails, since those are not laws but self-imposed rules. Common society also imposes conventions of discussion too, not laws. And I think that Our Author is not innocent here: his aim is entanglement, the "assessed as a whole, as one system" which I think is to be avoided if possible, because his intent looks to be horse-trading amongst different liberties.

A final point. The inability to take advantage of one's rights and opportunities as a result of poverty and ignorance, and a lack of means generally, is sometimes counted among the constraints definitive of liberty. I shall not, however, say this, but rather I shall think of these things as affecting the worth of liberty, the value to individuals of the rights that the first principle defines. With this understanding, and assuming that the total system of liberty is drawn up in the manner just explained, we may note that the two-part basic structure allows a reconciliation of liberty and equality. Thus liberty and the worth of liberty are distinguished as follows: liberty is represented by the complete system of the liberties of equal citizenship, while the worth of liberty to persons and groups is proportional to their capacity to advance their ends within the framework the system defines. Freedom as equal liberty is the same for all; the question of compensating for a lesser than equal liberty does not arise. But the worth of liberty is not the same for everyone. Some have greater authority and wealth, and therefore greater means to achieve their aims. The lesser worth of liberty is, however, compensated for, since the capacity of the less fortunate members of society to achieve their aims would be even less were they not to accept the existing inequalities whenever the difference principle is satisfied. But compensating for the lesser worth of freedom is not to be confused with making good an unequal liberty. Taking the two principles together, the basic structure is to be arranged to maximize the worth to the least advantaged of the complete scheme of equal liberty shared by all. This defines the end of social justice.

As before, I think his "to maximize the worth to the least advanaged" is merely his own personal preference, rather than the logically-deduced postulate that he thinks it is. That this defines "social justice" as far as he is concerned is fine by me, because I'm with Hayek on social justice.

And so I'm no keener than I was before.

Refs

* Revive Construction, Not the Rust Belt

* Book review: Why Materialism is Baloney - Bernardo Kastrup