The headline seems bleedin' obvious really. But the Graun is excited by it: Fabian Dablander, the lead author, said the belief that technology will largely solve climate change and its consequences, labelled “techno-optimism”, can lead to an over reliance on unproven solutions at the expense of the far-reaching socioeconomic transformations needed to address the climate and nature crisis. I blame Timmy for pointing this piece out.Stoat
Taking science by the throat...
2026-10-08
Scientists who put faith in technology less likely to take climate action
The headline seems bleedin' obvious really. But the Graun is excited by it: Fabian Dablander, the lead author, said the belief that technology will largely solve climate change and its consequences, labelled “techno-optimism”, can lead to an over reliance on unproven solutions at the expense of the far-reaching socioeconomic transformations needed to address the climate and nature crisis. I blame Timmy for pointing this piece out.2026-10-07
The Fall of the Rebel Angels and Friends
To Belgium, to G(h)ent and surrounds, to see the wonders thereof.
This is by Bruegel the Elder, not Bosch, wiki will tell you all about it. I saw this many moons ago in 2007, but thought less about it then. Here is a close up of a fragment.
It is all very wonderful, down to the strange frog-like thing aching to pull open her swollen belly and release her spawn. It is dream-like; similarly, in the Massacre of the Innocents, there are some dogs playing in the background, while in the foreground the hard men kick down doors.
I had thought that Milton made this up; but obvs not, this is too early. And wiki tells me it is in that reliable source, Revelations.
There's some Boschish too.
Refs
2026-09-13
Book review: Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief
This is a bad book: one-sided, not honest, more akin to propaganda than philosophy... unless you're familiar with The Republic, of course. And also wrong2. So this "review" is more me filling in the other side. As to why I should bother with something so bad: I blame E for owning it; and the boundaries of rights is an interesting subject.Context: Goodreads; Wiki. As far as I can tell, their project has been a total failure. One reason for that is that law is custom; this doesn't seem to be a concept that they are familiar with, despite their reliance on the common law.
To get a few snarks out of the way: the intro tells us that the authors are "renowned philosophers" - how modest of them - who "consider" the issues. But they are lying: most of them are associate professors, a lowly form of USAnian academic life. And this is no open-minded consideration of the issue: these people have made their minds up on the pro-animal-rights side, and will not consider arguments against. They also have an irritating tendency to quote someone saying something they agree with, and then treat that as a settled point in their favour. This is also a good place to say that they made so many errors that I cannot even mention them all.
Their argument proceeds under four heads: species membership; social contract; community membership; and capacities.
Under species membership they make the apparently sensible argument that biological categories can't provide a rational basis for rights moral or legal or matters of that ilk. They don't do a good job of distinguishing morality from legality. Legally, they notice that entities can only be persons or things, and appear to dislike this; they have a third category to propose, but they don't mention it until the end of the book. They apply for habeus corpus on behalf of some chimps, which is rejected, but - in my view - vitiate their own argument by applying for HC to move them from captivity by individuals into a "sanctuary" - which is to say, captivity somewhere else (p 94 belatedly admits this; and also admits that the court noticed). This implicitly admits the obvious: chimps can't live freely as part of human society.
Why is species membership a sensible legal definition of personhood? Because it works4; because it is custom; and because it is an easily applied test. Our Authors do their best to obscure that last point, wurbling around about how problematic the concept of race is blah blah blah but it won't work: "is this a human?" is far too easily answered a question for their equivocation to do away with.
One day, perhaps, we will meet space aliens and have to rethink this. But the method of rethink is fairly obvious and to all appearances not needed in the near future, so we don't need to worry about it. Rather sooner, perhaps, we will meet AI and have to rethink this. But I doubt that will help the chimps.
Species membership pretty well exhausts the legal matters, but OA quotes the courts discussing reciprocity of rights and responsibilities; and so we come to social contract, which is a perfectly sensible thing to discuss in this context. OA immeadiately bring up the distinction - vital in their eyes - between persons and citizens; the latter being persons participating in the social contract. They need to do this because chimps can't - are not able to - participate, obvs; in my view this is good evidence against chimp personhood. This is the point to note that we allow personhood to humans who aren't able to participate - natural fooles; infants; the mad or demented. Partly this is due to natural sympathy; partly to avoid having to deal with the inevitable edge cases3. OA then attempt to reverse this: if you can "bear rights"1 then you are a person, even if you cannot bear responsibilities. They then, straining mightly, use Rawls's broken "Veil of Ignorance" stuff to argue that perhaps we would agree under said VoI to extend the contract and thus rights to non-human non-rational entities. I don't think we would. But if we did consider this, unfortunately for OA, this proves too much: that argument extends the contract to stoats, weasels and ferrets, as well as OA's favourite charismatic megafauna.
Next, community membership. The idea put forward is that being a person is being a part of the community of persons (this is slightly circular, but you get their idea); in their words "We all come to be persons through embeddedness in interpersonal relationships of interdependency, meaning, and belonging". This is pretty vague. Does it help their cause? Not obviously. Their original complaint is that the chimps are being held in inhumane conditions, so they aren't part of the community. They deal with this by saying "ah, but they are capable of being part" - but is this true? I doubt putting a free chimp into a human community would end happily. Further, this would cover all house pets as well, and (due to the "are capable") clause, a great deal of other animals. Really, this attempt doesn't differ significantly from the previous.
Fourthly, we come to "capacities": things like sentience, emotion, autonomy, self-awareness, sociality. Do you need all of these, some, or shifting combinations to make you a person? In fact the list is arbitrary, and really is just a list of things that people do, retro-fitted. But never mind, because OA decide to pick "autonomy" and declare personhood based solely on autonomy (p 94). This doesn't work: autonomy is too vague, and too widely shared; indeed, on its widest fringes it is practically synonymous with life, and OA make no attempt to bound it; their efforts are all in the other direction, to stretch the category far enough to include chimps.
Under conclusions, they note that they don't have a positive account of personhood to propose. This is a fundamental problem for them, and leads them into "lawyers philosophy". "We don't know what a person is, but surely this makes you a person, and so...". As noted at the start, the law makes entities persons or things, and at last we get a thought of a third category (though they don't seem terribly enthusiastic about it and are careful not to endorse it): "sentient being". But the problem is that the simple creation of this category gives you no idea of what "rights" a member has. For example (p 105) they note a Mexican law obliging respect for the life of nonhuman animals, but as we all know that "respect" doesn't include not killing them; this is the kind of double-think you end up with when cute fluffy words run up against custom.
In my humble opinion
Enough of their wrongness. What is the right answer? The obvious answer is that personhood invloves being (capable of being) part of the social contract; and we extend that to cover natural fooles, etc., as noted earlier. What defence do chimps - or other things capable of suffering - get, from our moral or legal systems? Essentially the "repugnance" defence; see eating-a-dog bit from my review of The Righteous Mind: being cuuel damages ourselves.
Notes
1. "bear rights" is strange language; I can't tel if they really mean it, or if this is intended to be equivalent to "have rights".
2. Fundamentally, OA are nice, caring people who have allowed their compassion for chimps to override their reason.
3. On p 56 OA quote Carruthers saying exactly this. But somehow they fail to understand him; they cannot understand that there is an edge-case problem with "degree of rationality", which is a continuuos variable, but not with "degree of being human", which is binary.
4. If you object to "works" as grubby practicality that has no place in a philosophical discussion, I remind you that this is also a legal discussion; indeed primarily legal at this point.
Refs
* The paradox of American multiculturalism.
* Climate Change: The World’s Most Overrated Problem.
* Were the Nazis Socialist? Only in Part. The Nazis were similar to socialists supporting economic statism, but different in other key aspects of their ideology.
2026-09-08
Book review: The Evolution of Morality
The Evolution of Morality by Richard Joyce: Goodreads; his website. This is only a partial review, as I DNF'd in chapter 2 because... well, for reasons I find somewhat hard to concretise. He is an academic (wiki2) and whilst the book is not a dry academic tome it does have all the whiffling and qualifications leading to pointless digressions and obscurations you expect from academia (see-also this review). Furthermore, he doesn't actually know what morality is, which is a bit of an issue for him; even more of an issue is that he attempts to get around this bijou problemette by nibbling around at the edges8; unfortunately this leads him into pointless digressions about moral judgements, which seemed like his main interest; at least, that's when I gave up.Refs
Notes
Checking up on Hazlitt with Gemini
2026-08-30
The Data Heat Island Effect: Quantifying the Impact of AI Data Centers in a Warming World
By Andrea Marinoni et al.. Coming to you and me via X. And of course, I begin by apologising for the intrusion of climate into this war-focussed blog.Refs
Notes
2026-08-22
Did you miss me (yeah) when I was a gay?
Last used in 2018, good grief, that was a while ago.Refs
2026-07-10
Arma Mangoque Cano
My attempts to wait for the end of the little tiff between the MM and the MMs1 has failed: here am I.Then I stripped them, scalp from skull, and my hunting-dogs fed full,And their teeth I threaded neatly on a thong;And I wiped my mouth and said, "It is well that they are dead,For I know my work is right and theirs was wrong."
Updates
Notes
Refs
2026-06-30
Book review: The Rise of the Western World
The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History by Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas. First published in 1973, this is a radical interpretation, offering a unified explanation for the growth of Western Europe between 900 A. D. and 1700, providing a general theoretical framework for institutional change geared to the general reader. It looks like you can read it here, or here, for yourself rather than rely on my unreliable summary; it is fairly short, and not hard going.It describes - in economic and political terms - the developments in the West, well in western Europe, but stops before the industrial revolution, saying "well there you go then: that's what laid the ground for the industrial revolution to happen in England". What it talks about is largely organisation; and how various rulers' desperate need for money in the short term lead them to a variety of expedients for taxation or other equivalent money-raising schemes; some of which were in the long term bad. So for example the Spanish crown favoured the Mestas because they were a ready source of income; but this worked against recognising property rights, and so was unfortunate in the long term.
Here's a quote, to give you an idea of their language and terms:
To understand the background, we must explain the functions of the state against a wider background than would be necessary in dealing with the feudal world alone. Even in our day, the government is primarily an institutional arrangement that sells protection and justice to its constituents. It does so by monopolizing the definition and enforcement of property rights over goods and resources and the granting of rights to the transfer of these assets. In return for this service, the state receives payment in the form of taxes. Since economies of scale in the provision of protection and justice make this transaction potentially worthwhile to the constituents, a basis exists for a mutually advantageous trade between the governed and the government. So long as economies of scale continue, the state's widened protection and enforcement of property rights increases the income of all constituents and this saving is divided in some manner between the constituents and the state. What determines the division of these savings? The citizens are interested in receiving as much of the incremental income as possible; but so is the state, since its very survival during this period often depends on the maximization of present revenues. Let us consider again the historical evidence of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as described in...
I find this helpful; it strips off so much of the gunk. But there's also some more fact-based stuff, if you're interested in population, or prices, of the evolution of the manorial / feudal systems.
We end up considering France, Spain (unfortunates) and the Netherlands and England (fortunate); I forget why Italy and Germany fall out of the analysis. But the end result, though they don't say it, is essentially trial-and-error, or Darwinistic: people try stuff, sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't, places where they do things that work well thrive, others don't. We and the Neds got property rights; the Frogs and the Spics got a strong crown. You may notice a certain vagueness of my part here: although I've only just finished reading it, the details are already fading.
The book is prone to say things like "progress was not possible until the private and societal rates of return were made to coincide". By which it means, that unless entrepeneurs and inventors could capture a significant portion of the return from newe thinges - which required new laws, or new systems -, they would not put in the time, effort and resources - the investment - required to produce those newe thinges, from which all benefit. This is I think a useful overarching perspective; a summary, which makes it easier to order and think about individual events. And yet it doesn't actually explain any of the individual events, obvs.Disappointingly, there's nothing here on "why the West won": they don't talk at all about why anywhere else, perhaps most obviously China, didn't succeed. See-also The Grand Titration. Put into this framework, the answer is likely lack of competition; a lesson for our times. If you only have one go at getting the right answer, you'll probably fail.
Refs
* 1776 in the US and Latin America.
* We woz wrong about oil, sez El Econo.
* Europe's Weather Losses Keep Climbing; But a new loss normalization finds no trend after accounting for economic growth - guess who.
* The Declaration of Independence and the Case for Non-Ethnic Secession.
* The Causal Effect of Income is (Often) Zero.
* Rich World, Poor World: RCP 8.5, IPAT, and Climate Impacts Reconsidered.
* Why We've Been Thinking about the Fertility Crisis Wrong: Did humans evolve to seek solitude?
* A Conservative Court—Not a Trump Court.
* Airpower Did Not Fail in Iran — Simplistic Thinking Did.
* JD Vance's crusade against GDP is wrong and bad: Making Americans poorer won't make our society better. While I'm here: for me, see GDP impartially consider'd and links therein in particular Is Decoupling GDP Growth from Environmental Impact Possible?; and to Limits to Growth comments.
2026-06-27
Peace in our time
This was going to be a post about the end of the MM-MMs war, but that doesn't seem to be quite over yet, so instead it is about the hopeful Trilateral Framework Between the United States of America, the State of Israel, and the Republic of Lebanon.Refs
2026-06-26
Mayflies
Another year, another Mays. They flow past like water. 2025; 2024; 2023...Refs
2026-06-03
St Gervais
I'm just back from a trip down to the Chamonix valley for some low level alpine type fun, but being now a retired gentleman of leisure, had time enough to spend half a week getting there and much the same back, visiting more cathedrals than I can remember along the way, as well as Meung.Refs
2026-05-23
Book review: The Allegory of Love
I don't have a lot to say about this but want to record reading it. See some Goodreads reviews for things I might have said, if my memory were better. My picture, of the cover (FFS flickr on phone won't let me embed it, so for now I'll just reuse that image), is I see with amusement the picture I used for The Discarded Image; this may have been Hulme's fault. I found this harder going than TDI, perhaps because I do not have the congenial model in my mind. It has however inspired me to acquire The Romance of the Rose (Dahlberg translation), and to begin reading it in Meung sur Loire.Just as TDI transformed or perhaps just informed how I saw ye olde folkes' views of that aspect, so I found TAOL very helpful in getting at least some initial hooks in... well, the bookes it covers: ROTR, Fairie Queene - which I haven't yet ordered - and others. However I am conscious how much of Lewis's thought slips my mind even as I read it; I am too unfamiliar with this stuff.
Here's a sample of Lewis:
In many periods the historian of literature discovers a dominant literary form, such as the blood tragedy among the Elizabethans, or satire in the eighteenth century, or the novel of sentiment and manners in the last age or in our own. During the years between Chaucer's death and the poetry of Wyatt allegory becomes such a dominant form and suffers all the vicissitudes to which dominant forms are exposed. For it must be noticed that such dominance is not necessarily good for the form that enjoys it. When every one feels it natural to attempt the same kind of writing, that kind is in danger. Its characteristics are formalized. A stereotyped monotony, unnoticed by contemporaries but cruelly apparent to posterity, begins to pervade it. Thus, even in times that I can still remember, the threadbare motives of the novel were not nearly so obvious as they now threaten to become. The monotony of Augustan satire, on the other hand, is easily felt; that of Italianate blank-verse tragedy more easily still; and that of late medieval allegory unescapably and with resentment. In the second place, a dominant form tends to attract to itself writers whose talents would have fitted them much better for work of some other kind. Thus the retired Cowper writes satire in the eighteenth century; or in the nineteenth a mystic and natural symbolist like George Macdonald is seduced into writing novels. Thus in the fifteenth and sixteenth century we have the Assembly of Ladies written by a poet who has no better vocation to allegory than that of fashion. And thirdly-which is more disastrous-a dominant form attracts to itself those who ought not to have written at all; it becomes a kind of trap or drain towards which bad work moves by a certain 'kindly enclyning'. Youthful vanity and dullness, determined to write, will almost certainly write in the dominant form of their epoch. It is the operation of this law which has given later medieval allegory and hence allegory in general a bad name. A recognition of the law will perhaps liberate our critical faculties to distinguish between good and bad work-between the poetic use and the fashionable abuse.
But there is yet another 'accident' to which dominant forms are liable, and it is one which much concerns the historian. Often, though not always, we can detect under the apparent sameness of such productions the burgeoning of new forms, and find that a tradition which seemed most strictly bound to the past is big with the promise, or the threat, of the future. I half suspect that such a process is going on about us while I write: that the novel, which we saw becoming so biographical in works like Sinister Street and so preoccupied with period in works like The Forsyte Saga, is even now transforming itself-has transformed itself, in the work of Strachey and M. Maurois and Mr. Herbert Read-into the imaginative biography, a genuinely new form standing at the same distance from biography proper as the Chronicle play stands from the 'just' history.
And on Courtesy:
We are to conceive of courtesy as the poetry of conduct, an 'unbought grace of life' which makes its possessor immediately loveable to all who meet him, and which is the bloom (as Aristotle would say) - the supervenient perfection - on the virtues of charity and humility.
2026-05-01
Book review: The Handmaid's Wail
Dead famous, but also dead boring2. The surface veneer is tolerable: La Atwood has clearly been to writer's school and learnt how to write words1, but they forgot the bit about writing an interesting story; or perhaps that bit isn't teachable. There is a colourless cloying pallid dry dusty silence spreading over the prose4; this contrasts with, say, Moby Dick - another wildly popular-in-the-lists book that no-one except me ever reads - which at least has some salt and colour to its language and vigour to its speech. Proust can also be boring; but unlike LA, Marcel rewards you in the end with beauty. As well as some fascinating insights into the culture of his times. LA has no interesting insights into culture to offer, because her culture is entirely made up and not at all plausible3.Refs
Notes
2026-04-17
There Is No Progress in Philosophy
There Is No Progress in Philosophy will be an idea familiar to us all; my particular text is taken from an article published in 2011 but brought to my attention by Twatter. And since I haven't ranted about the evils of philosophy for a while now, and nothing much else seems to be happening, I thought I would indulge myself.Refs
2026-04-11
Good news
It is always charming to be the bearer of good news, so I am pleased to reveal to you that Donald Trump is the war’s biggest loser, in the words of the Economist. Since the MM has been at worst mildly inconvenienced, those grieving for the dearly departed, and indeed the very shades, can take comfort that their losses are even less.
Most of the meeja seem to feel that the war has been pointless, which is just their disappointment at not getting a clear-cut result that their tiny minds can grasp. That the MMs have been "knocked back"1 isn't something they can understand.Refs
Notes
2026-03-26
Book review: The Case Against Education
The Case Against Education is a book written by libertarian economist Bryan Caplan and published in 2018 by Princeton University Press. Drawing on the economic concept of job market signaling and research in educational psychology, the book argues that much of higher education is very inefficient and has only a small effect in improving human capital, contrary to the conventional consensus in labor economics. Caplan argues that the primary function of education is not to enhance students' skills but to certify their intelligence, conscientiousness, and conformity—attributes that are valued by employers. He ultimately estimates that approximately 80% of individuals' return to education is the result of signaling, with the remainder due to human capital accumulation, as wiki says. Or you can try Goodreads. As BC himself notes, almost no-one changes their mind as a result of reading the book, so entrenched are everyone's opinions; so I'm not going to make any attempt to convince you he is correct: read the book if you want the details.Refs
2026-03-17
Another advancement of science
The classic Science advances one funeral at a time refers; and I swear I have at least one other riffing on the theme. And today brings us Population Doomster and False Prophet of Ecological Apocalypse Paul Ehrlich Has Died. Wiki tells me that "statistician Paul A. Murtaugh says that Ehrlich was largely correct" but that is drivel. Michael Mann says he "was a friend and a hero. He will be greatly missed" and whinges that Julian Simon said Ehrlich was an alarmist purveyor of doom and gloom. Sadly, shortage of electrons - could it be anything else - prevents Mann from noting that Simon won the bet.David Friedman wrote:>In article <3cc1...@news.nwl.ac.uk>, w...@bas.ac.uk wrote:>> >...I get>> >an estimated world total deaths due to nutritional deficiency>> >during the 1970s of 5,061,129 or a nice round five million.>> Well, you've done quite a bit of work on that: thanks.>> I'll go with 5M, until something more definitive turns up.
>But those aren't famine deaths. That's coming from an estimate of "deaths>world-wide due to all nutritional deficiencies." Poor nutrition results>in an increase in death rates long before anyone is starving to death.So what. Its an upper bound. If correct, famine deaths were less than 5M,and Erlich was wildly wrong (on this point).Well, you've done quite a bit of work on that: thanks.I'll go with 5M, until something more definitive turns up.


